**Supplemental Appendix for: “How Incivility On Partisan Media (De-)Polarizes the Electorate”**

**1. Related Work**

The work that comes closest to our study is Arceneaux and Johnson (2013: 142-144). They show that partisan outlets with uncivil segments can reduce trust in institutions and media, consistent with the work on the general effects of incivility (e.g., Mutz 2015). They do not, however, independently vary slant and civility. More generally, our study is consistent with some past work such as Klar and Krupnikov’s (2016) finding that partisan disagreement vitiates partisan identity and trust, Levendusky and Malhotra’s (2016) finding that what amounts to uncivil polarization moderates issue positions, and Mutz’s (2015) finding that incivility decreases trust. These works do not explore the impact of incivility from different partisan programs. Also relevant is Gervais (2014, 2015, 2017), who shows that incivility, particularly from the out-party, activates anger in people, consistent with our results. He further shows that incivility from either party affects enthusiasm and anxiety, and generates several behavioral manifestations (i.e., encouraging those who see media/elite incivility to become more uncivil themselves). Other relevant work on incivility and political communication includes Kenski et al. 2017, Muddiman and Stroud 2017, *inter alia*.

In terms of specifics, our hypothesis 1 predicts that relative to civil partisan media communications, uncivil partisan media from one’s own party will lead the individual to be less favorable, less trusting, and have lower affect toward his or her party, all else constant. This prediction maps closely to the aforementioned work by Klar and Krupnikov (2015: 66-69). They find that insurmountable partisan disagreement (which is akin to partisan incivility) generates negative imagery and a movement away from partisanship. It also coheres with the “black-sheep effect” where in-group norm violators are judged more harshly (e.g., Reese, Steffens, and Jonas 2013). That said, our (unexpected) finding that in-party incivility positively affects out-party evaluations ostensibly contradicts Klar and Krupnikov (2016) who might suggest dislike for both parties. Our data (and lack of a control group) do not allow us to isolate the underlying mechanism at work—one possibility is that the civil conditions, by mentioning respect, may increase favorability toward the out-party (more than the uncivil condition causing change).

**2. Details on the Stimuli, Pre-tests, and Measures**

Our substantive focus stemmed in part because the Keystone XL Pipeline and/or the issue of drilling has been used in prior studies of partisan reasoning (Levendusky 2010; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Druckman et al. n.d) and, while clearly being an issue that divides the parties, it is also one on which participants were unlikely to have strong priors and thus their opinions were susceptible to influence. It is worth noting that during data collection the Trump administration approved the Keystone XL Pipeline, but that action received extremely little media attention. While our study was in the field, searching for the phrase “Keystone XL Pipeline” yields 417 hits in the Proquest NewsBank Archive. In contrast, during that same period, both immigration and the Affordable Care Act generated approximately 4,000 hits.

In terms of creating the stimuli, Sydnor (2015: 55) reports that incivility is more clearly perceived with visuals but it still is seen in text segments (also see Sydnor 2018). We took a number of steps to ensure this was the case, including the use of trait-based incivility (Brooks and Geer 2007), emotionally histrionic language (Gervais 2015), and visuals (Mutz 2015). Also, we opted to avoid better-known sources from each network (O’Reilly and Maddow), since respondents may have strong prior opinions about the sources and their relationships to the parties. We wanted to avoid possible pre-treatment conditioning. Notably, however, we drew substantially from real-life segments of *Hannity* and the *Rachel Maddow Show*, which aired April 6, 2012 and March 15, 2013, respectively (and Chris Hayes was the substitute host for the episode of the *Rachel Maddow Show* we utilized). All respondents were debriefed about the origins of the segments. In terms of the images, we relied on Google searches with the requirements that the visual only included the host (i.e., no other people) and could have come from the show itself (rather than another setting). The civil images are professional headshots posted by the respective networks. We identified the uncivil images via searches that included the given host’s name and search terms such as “angry,” “argument,” etc.

We opted not to include a control condition as we are not interested in the impact of civility from non-partisan sources. It also would have been unclear what a “middle civility” condition would look like, and most importantly, our hypotheses focus squarely on civil versus uncivil coverage from a particular partisan network and thus a control of any sort was not needed *per se*. The main drawback is we have no bench-line to compare movement sans stimuli but, again, that is beyond our theoretical focus. Not having a control also ensured we would have sufficient statistical power (by having few conditions), which is important given our heterogeneous treatment prediction (hypothesis 3).

To assess our stimuli, we conducted a pre-test with 88 undergraduates at a private Midwestern university. We randomly assigned respondents to read one of our four news segments (the number of respondent imbalance is due to random non-response to the survey rather than roll-off). We asked respondents to rate the perceived civility, perceived politeness, perceived ineffectiveness, perceived pipeline opposition, and perceived partisan slant. We present the results in the below table (A1). Respondents perceived the uncivil segments to be significantly less civil and less polite than the civil segments (from each given source). They did not, however, perceive differences in the effectiveness, partisan slant, or opposition/support based on the civility of the segment (from each given source). We are thus confident that differences in treatment effects reflect civility rather than argument quality or argument direction.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Perceived Civility Mean (5-point scale with higher scores indicating more civil) | Perceived Politeness Mean (5-point scale with higher scores indicating being politer) | Perceived Ineffectiveness Mean (4-point scale with higher scores indicating ineffective) | Perceived Opposition to Pipelines Mean (5-point scale with higher scores indication more opposition) | Perceived Partisan Slant Mean (5-point scale with higher scores indicating more Republican) |
| MSNBC Uncivil | 1.50  (std. dev.: .67; N = 32) | 1.44  (.76; 32) | 2.78  (.71; 32) | 4.72  (.73; 32) | 1.32  (.79; 31) |
| MSNBC Civil | 2.50\*\*\*  (1.15; 20) | 2.50\*\*\*  (.89; 20) | 2.79  (.79; 19) | 4.70  (.73; 20) | 1.40  (.88; 20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fox News Uncivil | 1.47  (.70; 19) | 1.42  (.51; 19) | 2.58  (.67; 19) | 1.47  (1.07; 19) | 4.53  (.84; 19) |
| Fox News Civil | 2.82\*\*\*  (1.19; 17) | 2.77\*\*\*  (1.25; 17) | 2.94  (.90; 17) | 1.65  (1.12; 17) | 4.41  (1.00; 17) |

**Table A1: Pre-Test Results**

Note: \*\*\* *p*<0.01, \*\* *p*<0.05, \* *p*<0.1 for two-tailed tests. All tests are within-source (e.g., MSNBC Uncivil versus MSNBC Civil).

Finally, we note that our main outcome measures in the experiment come from prior work: favorability from Lavine et al. (2012: 57-58), thermometer ratings from Levendusky and Malhotra (2016: appendix 5), and trust from Levendusky (2013: 174).

**3. Composition of our Sample**

We hired the firmBovitz Inc. to conduct the survey. They collected the data from a non-probability-based, but representative (on all key census demographics), sample of the United States. The survey was administered via the Internet.

Table A2 below compares our sample to the 2015 American Community Survey, the Census Bureau’s most recent estimate of the characteristics of the U.S. population.[[1]](#footnote-1)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Our Survey (%) | ACS Benchmark (%) |
| Income $100,000 or more | 17 | 25 |
| Female | 51 | 51 |
| Aged 65+ | 14 | 15 |
| Caucasian | 71 | 73 |
| African-American | 12 | 13 |
| College Graduates | 33 | 31 |
| High-School Graduate | 25 | 28 |

**Table A2: Comparison of our survey data to benchmarks from the 2015 American Community Survey.**

As Table A2 reveals, our data closely tracks the ACS benchmarks (unsurprising given that Bovitz Inc., our firm, uses them to construct its sample). Our sample diverges from the ACS in only a few ways, most notably in under-representing high-income individuals. But overall, our sample very closely matches the U.S. population along most key dimensions.

Notably, too, we find the average conflict seeking score (on a scale ranging from 1 to 5) for those who reporting watching Fox News in the last month is 2.75 (std. dev. = .85; N = 2,624) while those who reported not watching score 2.59 (.83; 2,406) (*t5028* = 7.04; *p* < .01 for a two-tailed test). The respective scores for MSNBC are 2.85 (.83; 1,726) and 2.58 (.83; 3,304) (*t5028* = 11.17; *p* < .01 for a two-tailed test). This suggests that conflict seeking individuals are more likely to watch partisan media, as is suggested in the text.

We additionally find, not surprisingly, that the average Fox viewer is significantly more Republican than a non-watcher while the average MSNBC viewer is significantly more Democratic than a non-watcher.

**4. Manipulation Check Items**

After the treatment, subjects were asked to rate how civil versus uncivil the treatment segment was (higher values indicating greater incivility), and how polite vs. impolite the segment was (higher values indicating greater impoliteness). These served as manipulation checks. Tables A3 and A4 below show regression results on these items (for partisans; we exclude pure Independents since they are not included in the main analyses in the paper).

Both measures reinforce the same conclusion: subjects see the uncivil treatment as more uncivil, as we would expect. There is also an interesting tendency for subjects to engage in some motivated reasoning: all subjects perceive the in-party treatment as more civil and polite (so they perceive greater out-party incivility; see columns 2 and 3). Fascinatingly, as we show in column 4, Republicans are more sensitive to civility than Democrats are (consistent with our findings in the paper, as well as with earlier arguments from Mutz 2015).[[2]](#footnote-2)

For those interested in the raw means for the incivility item, they are: (1) civil treatment, out-party outlet: 2.92; (2) civil treatment, in-party outlet: 2.31; (3) uncivil treatment, out-party outlet: 3.90; and (4) uncivil treatment, in-party outlet: 3.25. Note that higher values indicate higher incivility. This suggests that there are important differences between the segments in terms of their civility, differing roughly from “neither civil nor uncivil” to “somewhat uncivil.” It is likely the case that few subjects would see any political segment as extremely civil unless it was a PBS News Hour type segment, and that is an implausible contrast for a partisan outlet. Thus, we are confident that we have a contrast between more and less uncivil partisan segments.

For the politeness item, the means are: (1) civil treatment, out-party outlet: 2.71, (2) civil treatment, in-party outlet: 3.32, (3) uncivil treatment, out-party outlet: 1.79, and (4) uncivil treatment, in-party outlet: 2.27. Note that higher values indicate greater politeness.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| In-Party Outlet |  | -0.78\*\*\* | -0.73\*\*\* | -0.48\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.08) |
| Uncivil Treatment | 1.00\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* | 1.05\*\*\* | 1.27\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.08) |
| In-Party Outlet\*Uncivil Treatment |  |  | -0.10 | -0.52\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.07) | (0.11) |
| Democrat |  |  |  | 0.28\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.07) |
| In-Party Outlet\*Democrat |  |  |  | -0.45\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) |
| Uncivil Treatment\*Democrat |  |  |  | -0.38\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.11) |
| In-Party\*Uncivil Treatment\*Democrat |  |  |  | 0.76\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.15) |
| Constant | 2.60\*\*\* | 3.00\*\*\* | 2.97\*\*\* | 2.81\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 4,009 | 4,009 | 4,009 | 4,009 |
| R-squared | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.24 |

**Table A3: Incivility Manipulation Check**

Note: cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| In-Party Outlet |  | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| Uncivil Treatment | -1.02\*\*\* | -1.02\*\*\* | -0.99\*\*\* | -1.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| In-Party Outlet\*Uncivil Treatment |  |  | -0.06 | 0.42\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.07) | (0.10) |
| Democrats |  |  |  | -0.53\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.07) |
| In-Party Outlet\*Democrat |  |  |  | 0.76\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) |
| Uncivil Treatment\*Democrat |  |  |  | 0.46\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) |
| In-Party\*Uncivil Treatment\*Democrat |  |  |  | -0.86\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.14) |
| Constant | 3.01\*\*\* | 2.68\*\*\* | 2.67\*\*\* | 2.97\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 4,010 | 4,010 | 4,010 | 4,010 |
| R-squared | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 |

**Table A4: Politeness Manipulation Check Item**

Note: cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**5. Regression Results**

In the body of the paper, we presented our main set of results graphically (see Figures 1 and 2 in the paper). Below in Tables A5-A8, we present the regression results that underlie those graphs. As in the body of the paper, all dependent variables have been rescaled to the [0,1] interval.

Tables A5 and A6 show the baseline effects of incivility on our outcome measures, for both out-party (A5) and in-party (A6) sources; these are the regressions that underlie Figure 1 in the paper. Tables A7 and A8 show the interactive effects of conflict avoidance; these underlie Figure 2 in the paper. Tables A9 and A10 replicate Tables A7 and A8, but using the continuous measure of conflict seeking (rather than the dichotomous measure we use in Figure 2 and tables A7 and A8).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.75\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.18\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,980 | 1,964 | 1,984 | 1,982 | 1,952 | 1,984 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A5: Effects of Incivility, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.02\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.62\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,020 | 2,009 | 2,026 | 2,024 | 2,001 | 2,027 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

**Table A6: Effects of Incivility, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.02\* | 0.02\* | 0.03\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.00 | -0.03\*\* | -0.01 | 0.03\* | -0.02 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | 0.04\*\* | 0.03 | 0.03 | -0.04\*\* | -0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.19\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,980 | 1,964 | 1,984 | 1,982 | 1,952 | 1,984 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A7: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.02\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | 0.02\*\* | 0.03\*\* | 0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.04\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.05\*\* | -0.03 | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.04\* | 0.03 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.77\*\*\* | 0.61\*\*\* | -0.21\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,020 | 2,009 | 2,026 | 2,024 | 2,001 | 2,027 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A8: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.07\*\* | 0.09\*\* | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.08\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Conflict Seeking | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.02\*\*\* | 0.00 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Seeking | -0.02\*\* | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.02\*\* | 0.02 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.72\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,980 | 1,964 | 1,984 | 1,982 | 1,952 | 1,984 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A9: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Seeking, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict seeking is the continuous measure of conflict seeking, with higher values indicating those who prefer conflict. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.08\*\*\* | -0.08\*\* | -0.05 | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.07\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Conflict Seeking | -0.01\*\* | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Seeking | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02\* | -0.02\* | -0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,020 | 2,009 | 2,026 | 2,024 | 2,001 | 2,027 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

**Table A10: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Seeking, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict seeking is the continuous measure of conflict seeking, with higher values indicating those who prefer conflict. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**6. Regressions Split by Party**

Tables A11-A22 replicate the results above, split by party. Here, we treat Independent leaning partisans as partisans (Keith et al. 1992).

Tables A11-A14 show the effects of incivility for in-party and out-party sources separately for Democrats and Republicans. Note that here, incivility has a very similar effect for both parties.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.03\*\*\* | -0.03\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.03\*\* | 0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.62\*\*\* | -0.18\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,114 | 1,117 | 1,126 | 1,114 | 1,110 | 1,126 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

**Table A11: Effects of Incivility for Democrats Only, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.04\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.63\*\*\* | -0.23\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 895 | 892 | 900 | 898 | 891 | 901 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A12: Effects of Incivility for Republicans Only, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.02\* | 0.03\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.61\*\*\* | -0.18\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,114 | 1,107 | 1,115 | 1,114 | 1,102 | 1,115 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A13: Effects of Incivility for Democrats Only, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.05\*\* | 0.03\*\* | 0.06\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.75\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 866 | 857 | 869 | 868 | 850 | 869 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A14: Effects of Incivility for Republicans Only, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tables A15-A22 show the moderating effects of conflict avoidance, again estimated separately by party. Here, we see that the moderating effect of incivility is stronger for Democrats than Republicans. This is consistent with Mutz (2015: 106) who shows that Republicans (and Independents) claim to be less bothered by incivility, but react to it more strongly.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.04\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.00 | -0.04\* | 0.00 | 0.02 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | 0.05\* | 0.05\* | 0.07\*\* | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.77\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.18\*\*\* | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,114 | 1,107 | 1,115 | 1,114 | 1,102 | 1,115 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A15: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance for Democrats, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.06\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.05\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Conflict Avoidant | -0.00 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.04\* | -0.01 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 866 | 857 | 869 | 868 | 850 | 869 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 |

**Table A16: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance for Republicans, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.03\*\* | -0.02 | -0.03\* | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.04\* | 0.06\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.04\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.05\* | -0.03 | 0.06\*\* | 0.08\*\* | 0.04 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.77\*\*\* | 0.61\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,125 | 1,117 | 1,126 | 1,126 | 1,110 | 1,126 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

**Table A17: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance for Democrats, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.03\* | -0.04\*\* | 0.03\*\* | 0.05\*\* | 0.03\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.05\*\* | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.04\*\* | -0.01 | -0.05\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.05\* | -0.01 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.62\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 895 | 892 | 900 | 898 | 891 | 901 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A18: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance for Republicans, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.11\*\* | -0.12\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Conflict Seeking | 0.01 | 0.02\* | 0.00 | -0.02\* | 0.00 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Seeking | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.03\*\* | 0.03 | 0.03\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.70\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,114 | 1,107 | 1,115 | 1,114 | 1,102 | 1,115 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A19: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Seeking for Democrats, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict seeking is the continuous measure of conflict seeking, with higher values indicating those who prefer conflict. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.10\*\* | -0.09\* | -0.03 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Conflict Seeking | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.02\*\* | -0.00 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Seeking | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.74\*\*\* | 0.58\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 866 | 857 | 869 | 868 | 850 | 869 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A20: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Seeking for Republicans, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict seeking is the continuous measure of conflict seeking, with higher values indicating those who prefer conflict. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.10\*\* | -0.03 | 0.10\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.08\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Conflict Seeking | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.02 | -0.02\* | 0.02 | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.02\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Seeking | 0.03\*\* | 0.03\* | -0.00 | -0.03\* | -0.04\*\* | -0.03 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.82\*\*\* | 0.69\*\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,125 | 1,117 | 1,126 | 1,126 | 1,110 | 1,126 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

**Table A21: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Seeking for Democrats, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict seeking is the continuous measure of conflict seeking, with higher values indicating those who prefer conflict. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.07 | 0.08\* | 0.06 | 0.06 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Conflict Seeking | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Seeking | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.62\*\*\* | -0.24\*\*\* | 0.23\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 895 | 892 | 900 | 898 | 891 | 901 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A22: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Seeking for Republicans, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict seeking is the continuous measure of conflict seeking, with higher values indicating those who prefer conflict. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**7. Effects on Pure Independents**

In the body of the paper, we analyzed partisans (including partisan leaners) given our focus on partisan motivated reasoning as one of the dynamics underlying our process. But we can also analyze pure Independents as well. Here, there is no partisan motivated reasoning, but given the nature of our argument, we would expect that the uncivil MSNBC treatment would decrease positive feelings toward Democrats (relative to the civil MSNBC treatment), and likewise the uncivil Fox treatment would decrease positive feelings for Republicans. We expect this because Independents will want to distance themselves from the source and have no reason to feel anger *per se* (i.e., there is no “out-party” source towards which to feel anger).

Tables A23-A26 test these expectations for pure Independents. When they are assigned to the uncivil MSNBC treatment, they become more negative toward Democrats (relative to the civil MSNBC treatment), and when assigned the uncivil Fox treatment, they become more negative toward Republicans (again, relative to the civil Fox treatment). In short, incivility significantly affected the reactions of pure Independents, but mostly, only with regard to the partisan sources (e.g., attitudes towards Democrats when exposed to the MSNBC segments). We find no moderating effect of conflict orientation among pure Independents (also see Mutz 2015: 106).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Democrat Net Favorability | Democrat FT | Democrat Trust | Republican Net Favorability | Republican FT | Republican Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.72\*\*\* | -11.54\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | -1.97 | -0.11 |
|  | (0.14) | (2.39) | (0.09) | (0.17) | (2.43) | (0.09) |
| Constant | -0.18\* | 49.25\*\*\* | 2.38\*\*\* | 1.38\*\*\* | 43.97\*\*\* | 2.22\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (1.71) | (0.06) | (0.12) | (1.74) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 509 | 495 | 510 | 510 | 493 | 510 |
| R-squared | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

**Table A23: Effects of Incivility on Independents, MSNBC as the Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Democrat Net Favorability | Democrat FT | Democrat Trust | Republican Net Favorability | Republican FT | Republican Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.02 | -0.76 | -0.00 | -0.33\* | -9.12\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (2.48) | (0.08) | (0.18) | (2.52) | (0.09) |
| Constant | -0.49\*\*\* | 41.71\*\*\* | 2.20\*\*\* | 1.97\*\*\* | 45.77\*\*\* | 2.40\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (1.78) | (0.06) | (0.13) | (1.81) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 504 | 486 | 507 | 506 | 485 | 507 |
| R-squared | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 |

**Table A24: Effects of Incivility on Independents, Fox News as the Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tables A25 and A26 show the moderating effects of conflict avoidance for pure Independents. Here the evidence of interactive effects is weaker, though this may well be due to small sample size considerations.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Democrat Net Favorability | Democrat FT | Democrat Trust | Republican Net Favorability | Republican FT | Republican Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.61\*\*\* | -11.58\*\*\* | -0.17\* | 0.14 | -1.12 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.16) | (2.75) | (0.10) | (0.15) | (2.79) | (0.10) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.22 | -7.99\*\* | 0.33\*\* | 0.22 | -5.48 | 0.09 |
|  | (0.23) | (3.96) | (0.15) | (0.22) | (4.04) | (0.14) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | -0.41 | 0.63 | -0.50\*\* | -0.40 | -3.01 | -0.24 |
|  | (0.32) | (5.48) | (0.20) | (0.30) | (5.59) | (0.20) |
| Constant | -0.24\*\* | 51.21\*\*\* | 2.30\*\*\* | -0.56\*\*\* | 45.30\*\*\* | 2.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (1.96) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (1.99) | (0.07) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 510 | 495 | 510 | 510 | 493 | 510 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A25: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance for pure Independents, MSNBC as the Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Democrat Net Favorability | Democrat FT | Democrat Trust | Republican Net Favorability | Republican FT | Republican Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.02 | -0.00 | -0.04 | -0.61\*\*\* | -10.34\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (2.87) | (0.10) | (0.16) | (2.92) | (0.10) |
| Conflict Avoidant | 0.35 | -1.25 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -8.33\*\* | -0.07 |
|  | (0.22) | (4.02) | (0.14) | (0.23) | (4.08) | (0.14) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant | -0.17 | -3.25 | 0.15 | -0.06 | 4.21 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.31) | (5.68) | (0.19) | (0.33) | (5.75) | (0.20) |
| Constant | -0.58\*\*\* | 42.05\*\*\* | 2.21\*\*\* | -0.20\* | 48.01\*\*\* | 2.42\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (2.09) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (2.12) | (0.07) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 504 | 486 | 507 | 507 | 485 | 507 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 |

**Table A26: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance for pure Independents, Fox News as the Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**8. Partisan Extremity and Knowledge Moderation Results**

Below, we present results looking for interactions between partisan extremity and the treatment, as well as interactions with our quiz item (to see if more knowledgeable respondents reacted differently to our treatment). In all cases, we find no clear pattern of interaction effects. Partisan motivated reasoning theory (which we suggest underlies the out-party effects) sometimes suggests increased effects among those with more knowledge and stronger identities (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006). We suspect our lack of results when it comes to extremity stems from it not sufficiently capturing identity importance (the survey did not include alternative measures such as items gauging partisan social identity; Huddy et al. 2015). The lack of results for knowledge are interesting and may suggest that reasoning prompted by anger (i.e., what we posit) may operate differently than when other stimuli prompt motived reasoning. Future work is needed to more carefully unpack these mechanisms.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.03\*\* | 0.03\*\* | 0.05\*\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Strong Partisan | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.14\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\* Partisan Extremity | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.00 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,980 | 1,964 | 1,984 | 1,982 | 1,952 | 1,984 |
| R-squared | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |

**Table A27: Effects of Incivility & Partisan Strength, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Strong partisans are those who are “1” or “7” on the NES party ID scale (i.e., strong Democrats/Republicans). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Strong Partisan | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Uncivil\* Partisan Extremity | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.71\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | -0.19\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,020 | 2,009 | 2,026 | 2,024 | 2,001 | 2,027 |
| R-squared | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 |

**Table A28: Effects of Incivility & Partisan Strength, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Strong partisans are those who are “1” or “7” on the NES party ID scale (i.e., strong Democrats/Republicans). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Knowledge | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.01\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.02\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Uncivil\*Knowledge | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.71\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | -0.01 | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,980 | 1,964 | 1,984 | 1,982 | 1,952 | 1,984 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.06 |

**Table A29: Effects of Incivility & Political Knowledge, Out-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Political knowledge is an index of the factual items included in the survey below. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | In-Party Net Favorability | In-Party FT | In-Party Trust | Out-Party Net Favorability | Out-Party FT | Out-Party Trust |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Knowledge | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | 0.01\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.03\*\*\* | -0.02\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Uncivil\*Knowledge | -0.01\*\* | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01\*\* | 0.01 | -0.00 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.74\*\*\* | 0.55\*\*\* | -0.03\*\* | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,020 | 2,009 | 2,026 | 2,024 | 2,001 | 2,027 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.03 |

**Table A30: Effects of Incivility & Political Knowledge, In-Party Source**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Political knowledge is an index of the factual items included in the survey below. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**9. Issue Positions**

Our survey also included two items to gauge support for the pipelines and the production of oil (on 7-point scales) – the topic of the segments. We merged these two items together (α = 0.82). We anticipated variation in civility would affect issue positions. In the case the in-party incivility, the predicted decrease in trust would lead individuals to be less likely to follow the positions espoused by the source. Thus, relative to civil partisan media communications, uncivil partisan media from one’s own party will lead the individual to be in less agreement with the party’s position, all else constant. In contrast, the directional motivated reasoning that comes from out-party incivility will lead individuals to move in the direction of his or her own party (i.e., against the position espoused by the out-party source) (e.g., Levendusky 2013; c.f., Feldman 2011). Thus, relative to civil partisan media communications, uncivil partisan media from the out-party will lead the individual to be in more agreement with his or her party’s position, all else constant.

To test this, we operationalized the aforementioned merged variable so that higher scores denote moving the indirection of one’s party. Table A30 presents the results for issue positions, showing that consistent with our results, in-party incivility modestly moderates issue positions, whereas out-party incivility polarizes them.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Out-Party | Out-Party | In-Party | In-Party |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncivil Treatment | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.03\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Conflict Avoidant |  | -0.06\*\*\* |  | 0.01 |
|  |  | (0.02) |  | (0.02) |
| Uncivil\*Conflict Avoidant |  | 0.06\*\* |  | -0.04 |
|  |  | (0.03) |  | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.63\*\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.73\*\*\* | 0.72\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,984 | 1,984 | 2,028 | 2,028 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

**Table A31: Effects of Incivility & Conflict Avoidance on Issue Positions**

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. Conflict avoidant are the respondents who score in the bottom 25% of our conflict seeking scale (i.e., the most conflict avoidant individuals). Statistical significance is denoted by: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**10. Survey and Stimuli**

Generally speaking, which of the options on the scale below best describes your party identification?

*strong weak lean Independent lean weak strong*

*Democrat Democrat Democrat Republican Republican Republican*

Using the scale provided, please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with each of the following statements:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neither Agree  Nor Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| I hate arguments |  |  |  |  |  |
| I find conflicts exciting |  |  |  |  |  |
| I enjoy challenging the opinions of others |  |  |  |  |  |
| Arguments don’t bother me |  |  |  |  |  |
| I feel upset after an argument |  |  |  |  |  |

Some people watch particular television news programs or channels regularly, while others rarely or never watch. We are going to ask you about a few programs. For each, please select yes if you watch it at least once per month.

Do you watch [PROGRAM NAME] at least once per month?

\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

*Yes No*

[Respodents are asked about: “your local nightly news, on any network,” “NBC Nightly News,” “ABC World News Tonight,” “The CBS Evening News,” “MSNBC,” “Fox News,” “CNN”, and “C-SPAN.” ]

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

*Less than High Some 4-yr college Advanced*

*High school school graduate college degree degree*

Which of the following do you consider to be your primary racial or ethnic group?

*White African American Asian American Hispanic Native American/ other*

*Pacific Islander*

What is your age?

*under 18 18-24 25-34 35-50 51-65 over 65*

Are you male or female?

*Male Female*

***Many people don’t know the answers to these questions, so if there are any you don’t know, just check “don’t know.”***

How much of a vote is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a Presidential veto?

*Cannot 1/3 1/2 2/3 3/4 Don’t know*

*override*

Do you know what country is the world’s largest exporter of crude oil?

*United States Russia Iran Saudi Arabia Don’t know*

Which of the following is NOT a renewable energy source?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

*Hydroelectricity Biomass Coal Solar Hydrogen Don’t know*

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C.?

*Democrats Republicans Tie Don’t know*

Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional?

*President Congress Supreme Court Don’t know*

Who is the current U.S. Vice President?

*Mike Pence Joe Biden Paul Ryan Mitch McConnell Don’t know*

*True or False*: There currently is a ban on drillingfor oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico.

*True False Don’t know*

Would you say that one of the major parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? If so, which party is more conservative?

*Democrats Republicans Neither Don’t know*

*True or False:* Most of the oil imported by the United States comes from the Middle East.

*True False Don’t know*

**RANDOMLY ASSIGN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR**

Please carefully read the following excerpt from a news segment. It is about the construction of oil pipelines in the United States. The segment comes from *All In with Chris Hayes* that appears on **MSNBC**. Once you have read the segment, we will ask you a few questions about it.



Idiotic Republican lawmakers are trying to resurrect construction of the disastrous Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines. These pipelines would carry thousands of gallons of oil from Canada into the United States. The spills that will result due to sloppy Republican regulation will threaten life as we know it. When things fall apart, these parasitic Republicans will be to blame.

Republicans are weak and despicable, caving into special interests that only care about short-term jobs. **These parasitic Republican lawmakers want a massive environmental bomb.** Democrats **MUST** stand firm against these reckless proposals and use **any means necessary** to obstruct such proposals in Congress and the Courts. Bottom-feeding Republicans—and their fossil fuel masters—cannot be allowed to destroy the planet for their greed.

Please carefully read the following excerpt from a news segment. It is about the construction of oil pipelines in the United States. The segment comes from *All In with Chris Hayes* that appears on **MSNBC**. Once you have read the segment, we will ask you a few questions about it.



Republican lawmakers are trying to resurrect construction of the ill-conceived Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines. These pipelines would carry thousands of gallons of oil from Canada into the United States. Republicans are too pro-business and encourage lax regulation. This in turn will make spills from these pipelines more likely, and the effects will damage the environment.

Republicans may think re-starting these projects will create jobs, but they miss the point and are caving in to special interests who only care about short term-jobs. Even if Republicans think they are bridging the interests of workers and others, the truth is they are creating a massive environmental risk. Democrats must stand firm against these misguided proposals and use any means to oppose such proposals in Congress and the Courts. This is one case where we can respect them but we must stop the Republican agenda.

Please carefully read the following excerpt from a news segment. It is about the construction of oil pipelines in the United States. The segment comes from *Tucker Carlson Tonight* that appears on **Fox News**. Once you have read the segment, we will ask you a few questions about it.



Idiotic Democrats. Why do I say that? Well, Republican lawmakers are working on creating good-paying jobs by restarting construction of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines. These pipelines would carry thousands of gallons of oil from Canada into the United States, employing Americans and lowering gas prices. And what did the morons in the Democratic Party do? They cry about it – **these parasitic Democrats want to destroy the American way of life.**

Democrats whine about oil spills that will never happen, and stupidly argue that we should spend billions on useless technologies. All Democrats do is obstruct in Congress, and are to blame for bureaucratic rules that stop hard-working Americans. Democrats are **weak and despicable** and are threatening the American economy. Republicans **MUST** stand and fight these bottom-feeding Democrats and make America economically secure.

Please carefully read the following excerpt from a news segment. It is about the construction of oil pipelines in the United States. The segment comes from *Tucker Carlson Tonight* that appears on **Fox News**. Once you have read the segment, we will ask you a few questions about it.



Republican lawmakers are working on creating good-paying jobs by restarting construction of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines. These pipelines would carry thousands of gallons of oil from Canada into the United States, employing Americans and lowering gas prices. And what does the Democratic Party do? They cry about it – these irresponsible Democrats want to stymie the economy.

Democrats may think these projects will harm the environment, but they miss the point and are caving in to special interest environmental groups who care nothing about the American worker. Even if Democrats think they are bridging the interests of environmentalists and others, the truth is they are worrying about risks that do not exist and, in the process, taking away jobs from hard-working citizens. Republicans must make sure the pipelines move forward, and we stand firm against this misguided Democratic obstruction. This is one case where we can respect them, but we must stop the Democratic agenda.

To what extent was the news segment you just read civil or uncivil?

*Extremely Somewhat Neither civil Somewhat Extremely*

*Civil Civil Nor uncivil Uncivil Uncivil*

How impolite or polite was the language in the news segment you just read?

*Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very*

*Impolite Impolite Impolite Nor Polite Polite*

*Polite*

To what extent do you personally oppose or support the proposed Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines that would carry oil from Canada to the U.S.?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

*strongly moderately slightly neither oppose slightly moderately strongly*

*oppose oppose oppose nor support support support support*

To what extent do you personally oppose or support efforts to increase the production of oil in North America (Canada, the U.S., and Mexico)?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

*strongly moderately slightly neither oppose slightly moderately strongly*

*oppose oppose oppose nor support support support support*

You might have some favorable thoughts or feelings about the Democratic Party. Or you might have unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the Democratic Party. Or you might have some of each. We would like to ask you first about any favorable thoughts and feelings you might have about the Democratic Party. Then, we’ll ask you some separate questions about any unfavorable thoughts and feelings you might have. [[3]](#footnote-3)

Do you have any favorable thoughts or feelings about the Democratic Party, or do you not have any?

*No Favorable Yes at least one Favorable Thought or Feeling*

*Thoughts or Feelings*

***IF AT LEAST ONE, ASK (IF Said no skip the next question):***

How favorable are your favorable thoughts and feelings about the Democratic Party?

*Slightly Moderately Very Extremely*

*Favorable Favorable Favorable Favorable*

Do you have any unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the Democratic Party, or do you not have any?

*No Unfavorable Yes at least one Unfavorable Thought or Feeling*

*Thoughts of Feelings*

***IF AT LEAST ONE, ASK (IF Said no skip the next question):***

How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts and feelings about the Democratic Party?

*Slightly Moderately Very Extremely*

*Unfavorable Unfavorable Unfavorable Unfavorable*

You might have some favorable thoughts or feelings about the Republican Party. Or you might have unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the Republican Party. Or you might have some of each. We would like to ask you first about any about any favorable thoughts and feelings you might have about the Republican Party. Then, we’ll ask you some separate questions about any unfavorable thoughts and feelings you might have.

Do you have any favorable thoughts or feelings about the Republican Party, or do you not have any?

*No Favorable Yes at least one Favorable Thought or Feeling*

*Thoughts or Feelings*

***IF AT LEAST ONE, ASK (IF Said no skip the next question):***

How favorable are your favorable thoughts and feelings about the Republican Party?

*Slightly Moderately Very Extremely*

*Favorable Favorable Favorable Favorable*

Do you have any unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the Republican Party, or do you not have any?

*No Unfavorable Yes at least one Unfavorable Thought or Feeling*

*Thoughts of Feelings*

***IF AT LEAST ONE, ASK (IF Said no skip the next question):***

How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts and feelings about the Republican Party?

*Slightly Moderately Very Extremely*

*Unfavorable Unfavorable Unfavorable Unfavorable*

We'd like you to rate how you feel towards the Democratic and Republican Parties on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very unfavorable and 100 means very favorable. Fifty means you do not feel favorable or unfavorable. How would you rate your feeling toward each Party? **USE SLIDERS**

Democratic Party

Republican Party

How much of the time do you think you can trust the Democratic Party to do what is right for the country?

*Almost Once in a About Half Most of the Almost*

*Never While the Time Time Always*

How much of the time do you think you can trust Republican Party to do what is right for the country?

*Almost Once in a About Half Most of the Almost*

*Never While the Time Time Always*

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1. Data from the ACS is available at <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Throughout the paper and appendix, unless otherwise noted, all p-values are two-tailed. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. **PROGRAMMING** **NOTE: For the partisan items that follow (thoughts/feelings, favorable, feeling thermometer, trust, always have the respondent’s party come first, then the opposing party. So, for example, if the respondent is a Democrat, ask about Democrats first, then about Republicans. If the respondent is a pure Independent (doesn’t lean toward either party), then ask about Democrats first (on the issue of oil drilling more generally, pure Independents are closer to Democrats than to Republicans).** [↑](#footnote-ref-3)